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Combining Conciliation With Arbitration
of International Commercial Disputes
By STEVEN J. BURTON*
I. INTRODUCTION
Arbitration is a private procedure whereby contract parties agree
to submit their disputes to one or more third parties who will settle
them by making a final, binding, and enforceable award. It is cur-
rently the preferred method of settlement for resolving disputes aris-
ing under international commercial contracts. For a variety of
reasons, arbitration is often preferable to litigation in national courts.
Most important, arbitral awards are more predictably obtainable and
readily enforceable than court judgments. Arbitration provides a neu-
tral forum away from either party's home jurisdiction, protecting
against real and imagined prejudices and unfamiliar legal practices. It
also allows the parties to select respected arbitrators with interna-
tional experience, cross-cultural sensitivity, and, should the parties
wish, expertise in the subject matter of the dispute. Arbitration allows
the parties to tailor the arbitral procedure to the kinds of disputes
they might submit. Fmally, it maintains the parties' privacy in most
situations.
Unfortunately, arbitrating international commercial disputes has
not entirely lived up to its promise. Zealous and opportunistic litiga-
tion practices are increasingly supplanting courtly manners in interna-
tional commercial arbitrations. As a practical matter, claims that
arbitration is faster and cheaper than litigation appear increasingly un-
grounded. Though quick and inexpensive arbitration proceedings are
possible, the delay and expense can be great when the stakes are high.
Moreover, an arbitration can turn into a nightmare when highly
skilled arbitrators are not available, interim protective measures are
needed, or third parties should be joined in the proceeding or be com-
pelled to give evidence. In addition, arbitration has a striking cultural
drawback in an increasingly important subset of disputes-those be-
tween Asian and Western parties. The traditions of many Asian trad-
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ing nations abhor such a confrontational form of dispute resolution.
They prefer face-saving, mutually agreeable compromises to awards
proclaiming one party's rights.' Consequently, Asian parties may re-
sist clauses that send disputes straight to arbitration.
The practical and cultural disadvantages of arbitration are fueling
a growing interest in combining conciliation with arbitration, espe-
cially in Asia-Pacific commerce. "Conciliation"-often called "media-
tion" in the United States-is a process whereby the parties invite one
or more third parties to help them negotiate a settlement.' Asian par-
ties may prefer conciliation for cultural reasons. Western parties may
like conciliation for some of the same reasons that have led them from
litigation to arbitration or for those that now sustain the alternative
dispute resolution movement in the United States. Business persons
generally may prefer to process disputes in a businesslike manner. In
conciliation proceedings, the parties participate and retain control.
They can resolve a dispute while preserving an ongoing relationship
and enjoy flexibility without regard for formal procedures.
Conciliation, however, is not a completely satisfactory solution.
Since its effectiveness in Asian domestic settings depends partly on
social norms that support compromise, conciliation may fail in inter-
national transactions where similar norms are absent. Combining
conciliation and arbitration may be a better solution. For Asian par-
ties to international contracts, arbitration, and even litigation, are not
unthinkable when all efforts at negotiation and conciliation have
failed, the parties are no longer "friends," and a dispute continues to
fester. At the same time, arbitration clauses are reassuring to Western
parties who may want to hedge their bets on conciliation with a famil-
iar and reliable backup. A practical advantage of combining arbitra-
tion and conciliation is that arbitration can impose a final and binding
1. In the Confucian tradition, for example, parties conduct business on a friendly
basis within the cultural ethic of Li (peace, harmony, and conciliation), not Fa (strict appli-
cation of legal rules). Li emphasizes persuasive and accommodating dispute processing by
the parties in continuity with the give and take of their business relationship. It favors
negotiation and conciliation over compulsory procedures leading to sanctions imposed by
an outsider on one party, supplanting zealous advocacy and a victory for one party with
business judgment and compromise. Li discourages complaints initiated by one party
against another-especially those pointing a public finger at the latter for breaching a duty.
See, eg., ERic LEE, COMMERCIAL DisPUTEs SETrLEMENT IN CHINA (1985); James A.R.
Nafziger & Ruan Jiafang, Chinese Methods of Resolving International Trade, Investment,
and Maritime Disputes, 23 WmLAME'rE L. Rlv. 619 (1987).
2. In some contexts, "conciliation" refers to a mediation that results in a third party's
recommendation for settlement. In this article, the term includes mediations without
recommendations.
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resolution to a dispute while conciliation alone might drag on
indefinitely.
There are many ways to combine conciliation with arbitration,
and there are many ways to structure each part of the combination.
This article will identify three model routes from conciliation to arbi-
tration. It will then analyze two issues which a dispute resolution
planner should consider before choosing among these models. One
issue is whether the parties should conclude an advance agreement to
conciliate or wait until a dispute has arisen. The other is whether the
parties should integrate or isolate the conciliation and the arbitration.
Throughout this article, my comments will be general and suggestive.
A lawyer with a client and a contract should consider the full range of
practical opportunities in light of the specific transaction and the cli-
ent's preferences.
H. FROM CONCILIATION TO ARBITRATION
Contract parties may turn to conciliation when direct dispute ne-
gotiations falter. They do so by asking a third party-the concilia-
tor-to help them reach a settlement. The parties may agree to
conciliate when concluding their contract, before they find themselves
in a dispute that they cannot resolve by negotiation. Or they may
agree to conciliate after a dispute has arisen and they have reached an
impasse. The parties may ask one or more people to serve as concilia-
tors or they may authorize an institution to appoint a conciliator for
them. In international transactions, a pair of conciliators, one chosen
by each party, may help to bridge the cultural gap. More often, how-
ever, a single conciliator who is familiar with both cultures may be
more helpful.
Conciliation rules rarely move beyond the general goal of facili-
tating an agreeable settlement. They do not specify a conciliator's du-
ties in detail. For example, the International Chamber of Commerce
(ICC) Rules of Optional Conciliation provide only that "the concilia-
tor shall conduct the conciliation process as he thinks fit, guided by
the principles of impartiality, equity and justice."'3 Similarly, the new
Arbitration Rules of the China International Economic and Trade Ar-
bitration Commission (CIETAC), which authorizes an arbitration tri-
bunal to conciliate when the parties agree, provides only that "the
3. ICC Rules of Optional Conciliation, art. 5, reprinted in NV. LAwnRNcE CRnio Er
AL., INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE ARBITRATION app. at 3 (1994). See also
CAL CwV. PROC. CODE § 1297343 (Deering 1994).
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arbitration tribunal may conciliate cases in the manner it deems
appropriate."
'4
Article 7 of the 1980 United Nations Commission on Interna-
tional Trade Law (UNCITRAL) Conciliation Rules is longer but has a
similar effect:
1. The conciliator assists the parties in an independent and im-
partial manner in their attempt to reach an amicable settlement of
their dispute.
2. The conciliator will be guided by principles of objectivity,
fairness and justice, giving consideration to, among other things, the
rights and obligations of the parties, the usages of the trade con-
cerned and the circumstances surrounding the dispute, including
any previous business practices between the parties.
3. The conciliator may conduct proceedings in such a manner
as he considers appropriate, taking into account the circumstances
of the case, the wishes the parties may express, including any re-
quest by a party that the conciliator hear oral statements, and the
need for a speedy settlement of the dispute.
4. The conciliator may, at any stage of the conciliation pro-
ceedings, make proposals for a settlement of the dispute, Such pro-
posals need not be in writing and need not be accompanied by a
statement of the reasons therefore.
5
Given the discretion left to the conciliator, successful resolution
often depends on the conciliator's talents. A conciliator lacks any au-
thority to impose a solution or procedure on the parties. The concilia-
tor does not negotiate with the parties, but rather helps them
negotiate with each other. Success depends at all points on the par-
ties' cooperation and agreement. For example, a conciliator can make
a positive difference by:
* establishing a suitable physical and social environment for
discussions;
* taking informal measures to foster rapport with and between
the parties;
4. CIETAC Arbitration Rules, art. 47, in Michael J. Moser, China's New Interna-
tional Arbitration Rules, 11 J. INr'L ARB. 5, 20 (1994). See also CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE
§ 1297.301 (Deering 1994).
5. UNCITRAL Conciliation Rules, art. 7 (1980), reprinted in IsAa: DoRE, ARnrrRA.
TION & CONCILIATION UNDER THE UNCITRAL RuLEs: A TEXTUAL ANALYSIS 187, 189
(1986); Report of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law on the Work
of its Thirteenth Session (New York, 19-25 July 1980), U.N. Doc. A135/17, reprinted in
[1982] 11 Y.B. Int'l Trade L. Comm'n 22.
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* requesting information from the parties to educate himself,
refocus their attention, or bring out material facts;
* highlighting common ground and otherwise building confi-
dence in the negotiation process;
* refraining the issues to encourage the parties to rethink their
positions;
e identifying misunderstandings of which the parties are
unaware;
* pressing the parties to protect their interests and needs in-
stead of fixed positions or perceived rights;
• engaging in "shuttle diplomacy" between the separated par-
ties to neutralize personal difficulties between them or to help de-
velop new proposals;
* calling upon the parties to raise the level of representation at
the negotiations;
* suggesting possible accommodations when the parties' inter-
ests are not truly in conflict;
* proposing fact-finding procedures or expert consultations to
achieve a common basis for negotiation;
* listening to a party vent frustration in a way that will not
harm the negotiation;
" forecasting the likely consequences of continued deadlock;
" inviting the parties to conduct a mini-trial before appropriate
high-level executives, with or without the conciliator's participation;
and
• making nonbinding recommendations for a settlement if this
seems advisable.
Of course, all of these measures will not be appropriate in every
case. Nor is the list exhaustive. A conciliator should, however, always
invite, suggest, and encourage. The parties retain control and ultimate
responsibility.
6
It is important to note that differences exist between conciliation
in Asia and in the West. In Japan, for example, the culture generally
favors cultivating harmonious relationships, avoiding direct confronta-
tion, seeking the advice of respected elders, saving another person's
"face," and group solidarity. Japanese business practice emphasizes
autonomy in resolving disputes, privacy for disputing parties, and
case-specific solutions; agreement and integrity support the more reli-
6. See generally HENRY L BROWN & ARTHuR L MARRIorr, ADR PRINciPLES AND
PRAcricE 134-43, 163-65 (1993).
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able settlements.7 In the West, however, use of conciliation is a recent
development within the alternative dispute resolution movement.
Most commercial parties turn to conciliation to avoid crowded court
dockets and high litigation costs. Thus, the basis for conciliation is
pragmatic rather than a reflection of cultural traditions or values. In-
deed, an American party who "hangs tough" through negotiation and
conciliation may be as likely to earn esteem as censure from his peers.
Accordingly, not everyone in the West is comfortable with
conciliation.
Since there is no guarantee that conciliation will produce an
agreed settlement, parties negotiating international commercial con-
tracts should plan for that contingency. An agreement to arbitrate
would be prudent in most cases. When the parties contemplate both
conciliation and arbitration, they should consider the routes from con-
ciliation to arbitration. Though variations are possible, consider the
following three model possibilities:
* Say nothing in the contract about conciliation. When the
time comes, the parties can always agree to conciliate before arbi-
trating. Because conciliation depends so much on the parties' will-
ingness to cooperate, there may seem little reason to make a
conciliation commitment in advance.
* Blend conciliation with arbitration under arbitration rules
that so permit. The arbitrators may employ both methods during a
single proceeding as they see fit, blurring the lines between concilia-
tion and arbitration. Arbitration under CIETAC auspices follows
this practice.
* Conjoin conciliation and arbitration in a two-step sequence
in which the arbitration follows the conciliation. The parties' agree-
ment, or the rules they adopt, may isolate the arbitration by prohib-
iting either party from using statements made or information gained
during conciliation for evidence or argument in the arbitration. It
may prohibit the conciliator from playing any role--arbitrator,
counsel, or witness-in the arbitration. The ICC Rules of Optional
7. See generally Kuniko Oyama, Recent Developments in Japanere Arbitration Law,
10 J. INT'L ARB. 55 (1993); Tasuku Matsuo, International Business Dispute Resolution In-
volving East Asian Companies: A Perspective from Japan, in PRIVATE INVESTMENTs
ABROAD 12-1 (1992); Ko-Yung bng et al., Dispute Resolution in U.S..Japanese Commer-
cial Transactions-A View from the Japanese Side, in PRIVATE NvEsTmENTS ABROAD 11-1
(1990).
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Conciliations and the UNCITRAL Conciliation Rules9 follow this
model.
Each of these models has its advantages and disadvantages. Con-
sider two general issues: Should the parties conclude an advance
agreement to conciliate? Should the parties blend or conjoin concilia-
tion with arbitration? These questions are considered below.
IIL. ADVANCE AGREEMENTS TO CONCILIATE
Attorneys drafting dispute settlement provisions in international
contracts should carefully consider whether to include an advance
agreement to conciliate-one that commits the parties before a dis-
pute arises if they fail to negotiate a settlement on their own. The
parties can always agree to conciliate after a dispute has arisen. At
either point, the parties can draft their own rules of conciliation or
adopt standard rules such as the ICC Rules of Optional Conciliation
or the UNCITRAL Rules of Conciliation. Moreover, at either time,
the parties can locate the conciliation in a jurisdiction, like Hong Kong
or California, that, for enforcement purposes, treats an agreement
reached by conciliation as an arbitral award.10
An advance agreement to conciliate has two significant advan-
tages. First, such an agreement may itself be important in defining the
kind of relationship the parties intend. Asian parties, in particular,
may want assurances from Westerners that they will manage disputes
on a friendly basis by negotiation and conciliation. An advance agree-
ment to conciliate promises continuity from negotiating ordinary busi-
ness adjustments to processing less tractable disputes. Second, an
advance agreement makes it more likely that the parties will under-
take a conciliation effort if and when negotiations reach an impasse.
After a dispute has arisen and direct negotiations have failed, the par-
ties may see little point to further efforts, even with a third party's
help. An advance agreement may overcome such pessimism, and a
talented conciliator might get the parties back on the road to accord.
There are, however, both practical and legal disadvantages to an
advance agreement. As a practical matter, conciliation adds a some-
times costly layer to the dispute settlement process. While the actual
8. ICC Rules of Optional Conciliation, arts. 10, 11, supra note 3. On the ICC's expe-
rience under these rules, see Eric A. Schwartz, International Conciliation and the ICC, 5
INT'L Cr. AiRn. Buu.m 5 (1994).
9. UNCITRAL Conciliation Rules, arts. 19, 20, supra note 5, at 193.
10. HONG KONG ARB. ORD., ch. 341 § 2A (1982) (Hong Kong); CA.. CIV. PRoC.
CODE § 1297.401 (Deering 1994).
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expenses of the conciliation-including the conciliator's fee-are usu-
ally modest, it will take time to arrange for conciliation. The parties
must agree on a conciliator, schedule meetings, adopt procedures, and
educate the conciliator. In some cases, delay may affect a party's
practical remedies should the conciliation fail and that party prevail in
an arbitration. Interim protective measures may not be available from
any court and, if available, may display a distrustful attitude incompat-
ible with a successful conciliation. There may be some risk that par-
ties who conciliate in good faith may thereby impair their strategic
positions in a later arbitration. To a large extent, the parties can avoid
this by isolating the conciliation from the arbitration. H-owever, some
risk may remain.
A greater concern may be two legal disadvantages to advance
agreements. First, an advance agreement to conciliate disputes gives
both parties opportunities to bring legal actions to enforce the obliga-
tion to conciliate. Such actions may undermine the relationship
needed for effective conciliation and delay settlement of the dispute.
Second, one party may claim (or counterclaim) in the arbitration that
the other party breached the agreement to conciliate.
A. Enforceability of the Obligation to Conciliate
Efforts to enforce the obligation to conciliate in an advance
agreement can set an antagonistic tone, undermine the conciliation,
and delay resolution of the dispute. Such an obligation would seem to
be unenforceable either because the parties did not intend legal con-
sequences or because the agreement is too indefinite. In the United
States, however, the law is not settled. At least three cases have en-
forced analogous obligations. Some of these cases suggest, perhaps
mistakenly, that enforcing an agreement to use alternative methods of
dispute resolution is a way to support such alternatives. Conse-
quently, actions to enforce obligations to conciliate are plausible
enough to take seriously at the planning stage.
In AMF Inc. v. Brunswick Corp.,"1 two competing manufacturers
of bowling equipment had litigated a false and deceptive advertise-
ment claim. They settled that dispute, agreeing that either of them
could challenge any advertising or promotional claim that one party's
product was superior to the other's. They would do so by submitting
data to the National Advertising Division of the Council of Better
Business Bureaus (NAD) to determine whether there was experimen-
11. 621 F. Supp. 456 (E.D.N.Y. 1985).
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tal support for the claim. The NAD would render a nonbinding advi-
sory opinion for the parties. When AMF disputed the content of a
Brunswick advertisement, Brunswick refused to disclose its research
results to AMF. AMP filed a petition in federal district court to com-
pel Brunswick to submit its substantiating data to the NAD. Chief
Judge Weinstein concluded that the parties' agreement to seek an ad-
visory opinion was enforceable. He issued an order compelling sub-
mission to the NAD under the Federal Arbitration Act,12 holding that
the parties' agreement was an "arbitration agreement" within the
meaning of Section 2 of that Act.13 Alternately, he held that the
agreement was an enforceable contract under New York or federal
law and ordered specific performance under the court's equity power.
In DeValk Lincoln Mercury, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co.,14 an auto-
mobile manufacturer terminated a contract with an automobile
dealer. The dealership contract contained a mediation clause, requir-
ing the dealer to bring any protest, controversy, or claim involving a
termination or nonrenewal to the Dealer Policy Board. It expressly
made mediation by the Dealer Policy Board a condition precedent to
the dealer's right to pursue any other remedy available under the
agreement or the law. The dealer did not appeal to the Dealer Policy
Board. Instead, it brought several actions in federal court. The Court
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed a grant of summary judg-
ment for the manufacturer. It held that compliance with the mediation
clause was a condition precedent to suit; the dealer did not comply
with the clause's requirement to provide the manufacturer ample op-
portunity to settle their claims before litigation.
In an unreported case, Haertl Wolff Parker, Inc. v. Howard S.
Wright ConsL Co.,15 a partnership in the construction business fell
apart. The partnership agreement required the parties to refer speci-
fied kinds of unresolved disputes to a named individual third party for
a recommendation. The parties referred some issues to the named
individual, but the plaintiff in the lawsuit abandoned that effort when
12. See 9 U.S.C. § 1 (1982). In AMF, there was no agreement to arbitrate after the
NAD issued its advisory opinion. George Coombe suggests that judges might compel con-
ciliation when the parties agree to conciliate after one party makes a demand for arbitra-
tion, but before they select the arbitrators. George Coombe, State of the Art ADR The
Growing Influence of Asia, A.B.A. SEC. INT'L L & PRAc. REP. (Int'l Com. Arb. Comm.
Newsl.) Fall 1994, at 3, 8.
13. This holding-that an agreement to obtain an advisory opinion is an agreement to
"arbitrate"-is farfetched. The contract argument is more plausible.
14. 811 F.2d 326 (7th Cir. 1987).
15. No. 89-1033-FR, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14756, at *1 (D. Or. Dec. 4, 1989).
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unexplained practical difficulties arose. The defendant moved to stay
the litigation and to refer the relevant issues to the named individual.
The court denied the defendant's motion but dismissed the plaintiff's
legal claim with leave to refile without prejudice should the third party
not resolve the dispute. The court did so even though other issues
remained litigable, in effect requiring parallel proceedings in a differ-
ent forum and a possible return to federal court for an additional pro-
ceeding. The court reasoned that "a contract for alternate dispute
resolution should be enforced, and one party should not be allowed to
evade the contract and resort prematurely to the courts."'
6
Together, these three cases suggest that any obligation to concili-
ate a dispute might be enforceable under the prevailing law. In
DeValk Lincoln Mercury, the parties' agreement explicitly made com-
pliance with a mediation clause a condition precedent to legal action.
AMF and Haertl Wolff Parker suggest that a court may imply such a
condition when the parties agree to seek the help of a third party.
17
At the same time, conciliating under a decree of specific performance
or merely to satisfy a condition precedent to arbitration is not likely to
be productive. It may polarize the parties' attitudes, making it more
difficult to reach a resolution and causing significant delay. At the
least, the parties will have to agree upon a conciliator and meet before
either can take the dispute to arbitration. The need for cooperation in
taking these simple steps makes it possible for one party to delay the
arbitration for some time.
B. Breach of the Obligation to Conciliate
Consider whether an advance agreement to conciliate might be
the source of claims that a party breached the obligation to conciliate.
Such a claim might have two bases. First, a party who refuses to con-
ciliate might breach an express agreement to conciliate. In AMF, by
analogy, the court held that Brunswick's refusal to submit data to the
NAD was a breach of its express promise to use the NAD procedure;
the remedy was a decree of specific performance. Second, the parties
16. Id. at *9 (citing Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 7 (1984)).
17. This might not be true in California, where a statute governing international con-
ciliation and arbitration provides that "the agreement of the parties to submit a dispute to
conciliation shall be deemed an agreement between or among those parties to stay all
judicial or arbitral proceedings from the commencement of conciliation until the termina-
tion of conciliation proceedings." CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 1297.381 (Deering 1994). By
implication, this may mean that the parties do not impliedly agree to slay judicial or arbi-
tral proceedings before the commencement of the conciliation. See also UNCITRAL Con-
ciliation Rules, art. 16, supra note 5, at 192.
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may expressly or impliedly agree to conciliate in good faith. In many
legal systems, every contract contains an implied covenant of good
faith.'8 When the parties have agreed to conciliate, this general cove-
nant could include an obligation to conciliate in good faith.19 A party
might be held to breach such obligations, for example, by conciliating
pro forma or obstructing the conciliation process to delay settlement
of the dispute. 0
After conciliation fails, a party might bring a claim (or counter-
claim) for refusing to conciliate or for conciliating in bad faith in the
arbitration. The obligations to conciliate and to conciliate in good
faith are terms of the contract. A contract clause requiring arbitration
of "all disputes arising under the contract," or any clause of similar
scope, would seem to require arbitration of a claim arising under such
terms.
A recent decision by the Supreme Court of California suggests
that such a claim could be serious.2' The case did not involve an obli-
gation to conciliate or otherwise use the services of a third party. In-
stead, it involved an analogous obligation for contract parties to
negotiate the evolution of a technology-sharing relationship in good
faith on a continuing basis. The analogy may be instructive. The par-
ties to conciliation agreements intend to settle their disputes in ac-
cordance with the ordinary adjustments in a business relationship.
Conciliation is merely a way of pursuing such negotiations. In addi-
18. See UNIDROIT Principles for International Commercial Contracts, art. 1.8 (1992)
in 40 AM. J. CoMp. L. 703, 705 (1992). On the law in the United States, see generally
STEvEN J. BURTON & ERIc G. ANDERSEN, CoNTRAcTUAL GOOD FAr'm: FoRMATION,
PERFORMANCE, BREACH AND ENFORCEMENT (1995).
19. In several European legal systems, parties are under a general duty to negotiate
contracts in good faith. See generally Friedrich Kessler & Edith Fine, Culpa in Con-
trahendo, Bargaining in Good Faith, and Freedom of Contract: A Comparative Study, 77
HARv. L. REv. 401 (1964). When the parties have expressly agreed to conciliate, a duty to
do so in good faith follows easily from such a general duty. English law may not recognize
any obligation to negotiate in good faith. See Walford v. Miles, 2 W.LRL 174, 180 (1992)
(U.K.) (obligation too indefinite to be enforceable). In the United States, matters are
more complicated. The parties are not under any general duty to negotiate contracts in
good faith. They may be obligated to negotiate in good faith only when they have ex-
pressly or impliedly agreed to do so in a preliminary agreement that amounts to a contract.
See BURTON & ANDERSON, supra note 18, § 8.4. Since conciliation of disputes involves the
performance of a contract, good faith may be required independently of any analogy to
good faith in negotiations.
20. Cf Seaman's Direct Buying Service, Inc. v. Standard Oil Co., 36 Cal. 3d 752 (1984)
(party in dispute who denies existence of a contract in bad faith may be held liable in tort),
overruled by Freeman & Mills, Inc. v. Belcher Oil Co., 11 Cal. 4th 85 (1995); See BURTON
& ANDERSON, supra note 18, §§ 8.4, 8.5, 9.3.
21. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. v. Intel Corp., 9 Cal. 4th 362 (1994).
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tion, the case centered on an arbitrator's power to award remedies for
breach of an obligation to negotiate in good faith. The arbitration was
not international in character, and the arbitrator's view of the applica-
ble law is dubious. Nonetheless, the case suggests that unpredictable
and unwelcome consequences could flow from claimed breaches of
advance agreements to conciliate.
Advanced Micro Devices (AMD) involved a dispute over the
scope of an arbitrator's power to remedy a breach of art implied cove-
nant to negotiate in good faith and to reasonably further the goals of
the contract. AMD and Intel contracted in 1982 to "establish a mech-
anism for exchanging technical information so that each party ac-
quire[d] the capability to develop products suitable for sale as an
alternate source for products developed by the other party."22 With
respect to a product, the nondeveloping company would receive tech-
nical information and licenses needed to enable it to be a second
source for that product. The developing company would receive roy-
alties and the right to be a second source for other products of the
nondeveloping company, with terms calculated according to a formula
in the contract. The parties were to identify shared products later.
They did not indicate whether negotiations were to be adversarial or
fiduciary in character. A dispute arose when the parties could not
agree on AMD's request to be a second source for Intel's 80386
microprocessor.
The arbitrator construed the agreement to include an implied
covenant that each party would negotiate product agreements to
make the relationship work. This required each party to consider in
good faith the purposes of the contractual relationship and to reason-
ably negotiate to accomplish those purposes-to expand product lines
and save on research and development. The arbitrator found that In-
tel repeatedly breached its obligations to negotiate reasonably and to
negotiate in good faith .3 For example, Intel breached when it made
no actual attempt to negotiate remaining differences on specifications
for a part. It did this after determining that the AMD contract was
disadvantageous and after deciding to discontinue receiving products
from AMD. Instead of terminating the contract, Intel withheld this
decision from AMD for over two years. Intel apparently did so to
keep AMD in the Intel camp as long as possible and to delay re-
22. Id. at 368.
23. I doubt that most courts in the United States, including the California Supreme
Court, would so hold when arbitration was not involved. See BURTON & ANDERSEN, supra
note 18, §§ 8.4, 8.5, 9.3.
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vealing its marketing strategy to other competitors. However, be-
cause AMD's consequent lost profits were commingled with lost
profits due to its own inaction, the arbitrator did not award compensa-
tory damages as provided by law. Instead, he awarded AMD a per-
manent, nonexclusive, royalty-free license to any Intel intellectual
property embodied in AMD's 386 microprocessor and a two year ex-
tension of other patent and copyright licenses related to AMD's chip.
Not surprisingly, Intel challenged the arbitral award in the Cali-
fornia courts. It claimed, among other things, that the arbitrator ex-
ceeded his powers by granting a remedy beyond that authorized by
the contract or contract law. The Supreme Court of California upheld
the award. In California domestic arbitrations, the arbitrators may
decide ex aequo et bono (according to what is just and good) unless
the parties agree to restrict them to the law.24 The court reasoned that
judges should not independently re-evaluate the merits of a remedy
reflecting an arbitrator's best judgment. The policy of protecting the
finality of arbitral awards required extensive judicial deference to the
arbitrator's judgment on the remedy as on other issues. Conse-
quently, the court held, judicial review must be confined to a determi-
nation that the remedy awarded bears a rational relationship to the
contract and the breach, as interpreted and found by the arbitrator.
Awards must be upheld as long as they are arguably based on the
contract.
AMD suggests two relevant points concerning advance agree-
ments to conciliate. First, in an arbitration, a party could be held to
have breached an implied obligation to conciliate in good faith. Ac-
cording to the arbitrator's findings, Intel breached its obligation by
using the AMD agreement to delay AMD from competing with Intel's
product and by sending a deceptive message about its strategy to the
market. Similarly, one party to an advance conciliation agreement
might claim that the other used the conciliation for ulterior purposes
or to delay resolution of the dispute. Notwithstanding the arbitrator's
view in AMD, this claim would probably not succeed under the law of
good faith in most U.S. jurisdictions?5 It may, however, succeed in
international arbitrations governed by non-U.S. law.
A second point of concern is that a court might not set aside an
arbitral award if it grants damages on the assumption that, had the
conciliation proceeded in good faith, it would have been successful.
24. Moncharsh v. Heily & Blase, 3 Cal. 4th 1, 10-11 (1992).
25. See BURTON & ANDER sON, supra note 18.
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The arbitrator apparently made a similar assumption in AMD. He did
not award lost profits because AMD had contributed to its own losses.
Instead, the arbitrator awarded extensive and valuable intellectual
property rights to compensate AMD for the losses caused by the
breach. The court approved the remedy because the arbitrator had
the power to decide ex aequo et bono, which is ordinarily not the case
in international arbitrations.26 Had AMD not so contributed, how-
ever, it would have recovered lost profits under ordinary contract
principles (assuming lost profits were foreseeable and provable with
reasonable certainty). Based on standard contract law, then, an arbi-
trator might award lost profits for failing to conciliate or for conciliat-
ing in bad faith. Alternatively, and perhaps more realistically, an
arbitrator might award the costs of an arbitration made necessary by
one party's breach of an obligation to conciliate.
C. Default Rules and Drafting Strategies
The four cases discussed above suggest that obligations to concili-
ate contained in advance agreements could be enforceable. Presuma-
bly, enforceability would rest on a default rule-one that applies only
when the parties have not manifested a contrary intention. If so, the
parties can declare their intention not to be bound; in that case, the
law would have no business enforcing a contractual obligation. But
the law is far from settled on the point. Strong arguments support the
opposite default rule-holding obligations to conciliate unenforceable
unless the parties declare their intention to be bound. Twvo issues thus
arise: What should the law presume? Until the law settles, how
should parties draft advance agreements to conciliate?
Courts should use legal principles and policies to choose the bet-
ter default rule. The autonomy principle, which underlies much of
contract law, suggests that a default rule should implement the prob-
able intentions of most contract parties who conclude advance agree-
ments to conciliate. When making such an agreement, the parties
probably do not intend to attach legal consequences to -the obligation
to conciliate. They probably assume this obligation lo facilitate a
quick and amicable settlement outside legal channels--not to invite
26. The California statute governing international arbitrations and conciliations pro-
vides that "the arbitral tribunal shall decide ex aequo et bono or as amiable compositeur, if
the parties have expressly authorized it to do so." CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1297.284
(Deering 1984). By implication, the tribunal shall not decide ex aequo et bono if the par-
ties have not expressly authorized it to do so.
27. SmvEN J. BURTON, PRINCIPLES OF CoNTRACr LAW 55, 572-73 (1995).
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judicial compulsion or compensatory remedies, to breed litigation or
add potential issues to an arbitration, or to create opportunities for
delay or obstruction. Their intention coincides with the judicial policy
of encouraging settlements through alternative dispute resolution
methods (the "ADR policy"). This policy may have less force when
conciliation takes a case off the arbitration docket, leaving the judicial
docket unaffected. Nonetheless, the autonomy principle and the ADR
policy coincide in encouraging voluntary and cooperative approaches
to dispute resolution, and avoiding the costs of contentious
proceedings.
After a dispute has arisen and one party resists conciliation, prin-
ciple and policy may come apart. Contract law principles alone might
implement the parties' intentions at the time of contract formation. A
court might also refuse to enforce an obligation to conciliate on
grounds of indefiniteness. The ADR policy, by contrast, would sup-
port enforcing the obligation to conciliate if that would enhance pros-
pects for a successful conciliation.
The consequences of compelling conciliation are unclear. On one
hand, experience in domestic mediation practice in the United States
suggests that, when mandated by law, mediation is still effective at
producing settlements that satisfy the parties 2 8 On the other hand,
compulsion of conciliation differs from mandated mediation exper-
iences in two relevant respects. First, none of the reported studies on
mandated mediation involved compulsion at the request of one party;
instead, compulsion was by law. The former kind of compulsion
seems inconsistent with the cooperation and trust upon which a suc-
cessful conciliation depends. Second, the cases with which we are con-
cerned tend to involve sophisticated parties playing for high stakes in
an international context, while the studies on mandated mediation
concentrate on small claims and family disputes. The differences here
are too great for easy analogies. Thus, until we have a better under-
standing of the consequences of enforcing conciliation obligations,
courts might better support the autonomy principle and ADR policies
by holding conciliation obligations unenforceable.
At present, we have no reliable default rule. Consequently, par-
ties should consider drafting their agreement with special care. It
28. See eg., Jessica Pearson, An Evaluation of Alternatives to Court Adjudication, 7
Jusr. Sys. J. 420 (1981); Michael Shane, Mediation and Conciliation: A Personal View,
Speech at the Eleventh Joint ICSIDICC'AAA Colloquium on International Arbitration
(Oct. 17, 1994). See also Lucy V. Katz, Enforcing an ADR Clause-Are Good Intentions
All You Have?, 26 Am. Bus. L.. 575 (1988).
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might be unwise, however, to simply state that the parties do or do not
intend to be bound by the agreement to conciliate. Since an agree-
ment to conciliate may contain several distinct obligations, there may
be some clauses that the parties will want to be enforceable. An
agreement to conciliate includes a primary obligation to conciliate
and, often by incorporating standard conciliation rules, obligations an-
cillary to the primary obligation. These obligations may be "en-
forced" in different ways. For example, the parties may not want the
primary obligation to be enforceable by a decree of specific perform-
ance, by an order to compel conciliation or to stay arbitration, or by
an award of lost profits as damages for breach. However, they may
want to recover the costs of an arbitration made necessary by one
party's breach of the obligation to conciliate in good faith.29
The agreement to conciliate might also include ancillary obliga-
tions intended to have legal force in various ways. For example, the
parties may agree to refrain from arbitrating or litigating during the
conciliation proceedings; they might want to prohibit a court from
compelling arbitration or allowing litigation during the conciliation.
They may also agree to maintain the confidentiality of the conciliation
and to refrain from using statements made in negotiations as evidence
in a later arbitration; either party might want an arbitral tribunal to
enforce such a clause by refusing to hear evidence of statements made
in the conciliation. Additionally, they may agree to ban the concilia-
tor from serving as arbitrator, witness, or counsel in a later arbitration;
again, either party may want to enforce this before the arbitral tribu-
nal, when challenging an arbitrator, or when resisting enforcement of
an award. In sum, the parties might make the agreement to conciliate
enforceable in these and other ancillary ways while keeping the pri-
mary obligation to conciliate unenforceable or enforceable only in a
limited way.
IV. BLENDING OR CONJOINING CONCILIATION
WITH ARBITRATION
Whether or not the parties conclude an advance agreement to
conciliate, they can combine conciliation with arbitration in one of
29. The parties probably do not need to enforce the obligation to conciliate in order to
stay litigation or to avoid judicial interference. The agreement to arbitrate after concilia-
tion should protect against those events even before either party has filed a demand for
arbitration. See Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards, art. 11(3), June 7, 1959,21 U.S.T. 2517,330 U.N.T.S. 38; I. MAcNEtL ET AL., FED.
ERAL ARBITRATION LAW § 23.1 (1994).
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two model ways. First, they can blend conciliation with arbitration
under arbitration rules that so provide. Second, they can conjoin con-
ciliation and arbitration in a two-step sequence in which they isolate
the conciliation from the arbitration. The parties should consider both
practical and legal issues when making a choice between these alter-
natives (and their variations) at the planning stage.
A. Blending Conciliation with Arbitration
Consider, first, a blended procedure in which conciliation and ar-
bitration go forward together in one proceeding. The same tribunal
functions as both conciliator and arbitrator. The proceedings may
move from conciliation to arbitration and back again with no clear
lines of demarcation. When conciliation succeeds in producing an
agreement, the conciliator may incorporate the outcome in an arbitral
award.30 When the conciliation fails, however, the tribunal will render
an award in the standard way.
A blended procedure offers significant advantages. By agreeing
to a blended procedure, the parties commit themselves to a coopera-
tive relationship that can produce benefits before any dispute arises.
Moreover, a blended procedure is the procedure of choice in China.
Arbitration laws and rules in California and elsewhere around the Pa-
cific Rim make it possible for the parties to elect a blended procedure
if they wish.31 A confluence of Asian traditions and Western business
culture may make this alternative attractive to both parties.
A blended procedure also offers advantages in flexibility and effi-
ciency. The tribunal can move the parties toward an agreement in the
most appropriate manner as long as neither party balks at continuing
the conciliation. 2 For Asian parties, a respected third party's sugges-
tions may, for cultural reasons, be given considerable weight. Stub-
born parties from any culture may cooperate (and save face) when
they know the tribunal can impose an outcome should they remain at
odds. Moreover, if conciliation fails, the parties need not select and
educate new arbitrators. The arbitrators, in turn, may fashion an
award that the parties will promptly implement. For these reasons,
30. E.g., CIETAC Arbitration Rules, art. 50, supra note 4; CAL. CIV. NRoc. CODE
§ 1297.401 (Deering 1994).
31. E.g., CAL. CIrV. PROC. CODE § 1297.301 (Deering 1994).
32. E.g., CIETAC Arbitration Rules, art. 48, supra note 4 (tribunal shall terminate
conciliation and continue arbitration when one of the parties requests a termination of
conciliation).
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the parties might reach a resolution of their dispute mo:re quickly than
by a two-step process or by arbitration alone.
There are, however, significant practical disadvantages to a
blended procedure. Good arbitrators and conciliators possess differ-
ent skills and dispositions. Few people are talented at both jobs. A
blended procedure may hamper the tribunal in one of its functions.
A blended process may impair the conciliation effort. Effective
conciliation requires a relatively open and informal flow of informa-
tion between the parties and between each party and the conciliator.
Often, the conciliator should consult privately with each party to iden-
tify key interests and to shape promising proposals, without always
disclosing the entire discussion to the other party. The specter of later
arbitration may interfere with this information exchange, however,
because the parties may withhold important information due to fear
that the conciliator (or the other party) may later use it in the arbitra-
tion. Similarly, the conciliator may refrain from holding private meet-
ings during the conciliation in order to protect his later role as
arbitrator, thereby rendering conciliation ineffective.
A blended procedure may also impair the integrity of the arbitra-
tion. Many participants in international arbitrations see them as es-
sentially legal and adjudicatory processes. With this view, the
arbitrators must decide-on the facts and the law-whether a com-
plainant's claim is justified under the contract. Accordingly, arbitra-
tors, unlike conciliators, should not aim to accommodate or
compromise the dispute to protect the parties' key interests. In a
blended procedure, however, the tribunal will gain information during
conciliation that it would not admit in a separate arbitration. For ex-
ample, arbitrations may proceed mainly on documentary evidence,
but no conciliation would succeed on such a narrow factual basis. It is
often crucial for a conciliator to gauge a party's willingness to compro-
mise. When making an award, an arbitrator may be utder a duty to
disregard inappropriate information gained in a companion concilia-
tion. But no one can unring a bell.
Potential legal drawbacks accompany the practical drawbacks.
Most important, some argue, is that a legitimate arbitration guaran-
tees each party full participation by allowing it to present proofs and
arguments for a decision in its favor.33 Holding private conferences
may be inconsistent with such a guarantee. As Lon Fultler noted, "the
33. Lon Fuller, Collective Bargaining and the Arbitrator, 15 NAT'L ACAD. ARB. PROC.
8, 24-25 (1962).
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party not included in such a conference cannot know toward what he
should be directing the presentation of his case."'34 This could be a
serious drawback for two reasons. First, in some circumstances unsuc-
cessful conciliation involving private conferences can delay and dis-
rupt a later arbitration. All arbitration rules require the arbitrators to
be and remain impartial. Parties may challenge an arbitrator for par-
tiality-a move that can delay the arbitration significantly whether or
not the arbitrator is ultimately removed. The International Bar Asso-
ciation's Rules of Ethics for International Arbitrators provides that
"[p]artiality arises where an arbitrator.., is prejudiced in relation to
the subject-matter of the dispute. 3 .5 These rules continue:
[T]he tribunal as a whole (or the presiding arbitrator where appro-
priate), may make proposals for settlement to both parties simulta-
neously, and preferably in the presence of each other. Although
any procedure is possible with the agreement of the parties, the ar-
bitral tribunal should point out to the parties that it is undesirable
that any arbitrator should discuss settlement terms with a party in
the absence of the other parties since this will normally have the
result that any arbitrator involved in such discussions will become
disqualified from any future participation in the arbitration.3 6
Allowing the arbitrators to conciliate goes beyond making a pro-
posal for settlement. Meeting privately with a party, commenting on
the credibility of evidence, or expressing a view on the merits of the
dispute may be necessary for an effective conciliation. Such actions,
however, may open the door to a challenge for partiality in the arbi-
tration, even when the parties have agreed to private meetings. Such
a challenge may be more likely to succeed in a European than in an
Asian arbitration setting, but it may delay and disrupt the arbitra-
tion-and antagonize the arbitrator-in either.
Second, and more important, an arbitral award may be unen-
forceable when an arbitrator met privately with one of the parties dur-
ing conciliation. A court may decline to enforce an award when the
losing party was denied basic due process or enforcement would be
34. Id. at 25.
35. RuLs OF ETmcs FOR INmRNATONAL ARBITRAT Rs art. 3.1 (1987).
36. Id. art. 8. There should be less risk when United States law governs. American
judges increasingly mediate cases before the court. "A judge may, with the consent of the
parties, confer separately with the parties and their lawyers in an effort to mediate or settle
matters pending before the judge." MODEL CODE OF Jun ciAL Cownucr Canon
3(B)(7)(d) (1990). United States courts should hold that arbitrators have the same license.
See also I. MACNEIL ET A., supra note 29, § 26.3.1; CODE OF EmTics FOR ARBnrRAToRs
IN COMMERCiAL DISPUTES Canon IV(I) (1977).
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contrary to the public policy of the enforcing country.3" For example,
a court declined to enforce an award in Germany when the arbitrator
learned of evidence but did not inform the parties and (lid not provide
certain documents to the defendant.38 More recently, a Hong Kong
court declined to enforce a CIETAC award when CIETAC had ap-
pointed an independent expert but the defendant never received his
report.39 Justice Kaplan held that such a serious irregularity contra-
vened the principles of fairness and due process applied by the Hong
Kong courts.4 ° These precedents counsel arbitrators to conciliate only
with full disclosure to both parties even when that hampers the concil-
iation's effectiveness.
These practical and legal disadvantages do not mean that parties
should never blend conciliation with arbitration. The risks may be
small while the significant cultural and practical advantages are over-
riding. Although no general conclusion is appropriate, these disad-
vantages should lead parties to examine alternatives that minimize the
risks while preserving the advantages. For example, the parties may
provide that, when conciliation fails, the conciliator shall render an
award only if neither party objects. Upon objection, a new arbitration
would start with new arbitrators. Alternatively, the parties may pro-
hibit the arbitrator from conciliating until after they have presented
the evidence. The arbitrator then might prepare a sealed award,
which shall take effect only if conciliation fails to produce a settle-
ment. These alternatives, however, are half-measures. Another op-
tion is to conjoin conciliation with arbitration in a two-step process
isolating one from the other at the outset.
B. Conjoining Conciliation with Arbitration
Contract parties may prefer to conciliate their disputes when pos-
sible, resorting to arbitration only after the conciliation concludes.
41
37. See Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards,
art. V(1)(b), supra note 29.
38. See Christopher B. Kuner, The Public Policy Exception to the Enforcement of For-
eign Arbitral Awards in the United States and West Germany Under the New York Conven-
tion, 7(4) J. INT'L ARB. 71, 83 (1990) (citing Judgment of 3 April, 1975, Oberlandesgericht
Hamburg, West Germany, Recht der internationalen Wirtschaft 432 (July/August 1975)).
39. Paklito Investment Ltd. v. Klockner East Asia Ltd., 2 H.K.L. R. 39 (Hong Kong
1993). CIETAC's new rules, arts. 38 and 40, aim to prevent recurrence of this problem in
relation to evidence collected by the tribunal or expert's reports.
40. Id.
41. Under the ICC Rules of Optional Conciliation, art. 7, supra note 3, for example,
the conciliation process terminates when any of the following occur: i.he parties reach a
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In this two-step process, the parties may isolate the conciliation from
the arbitration in two key ways. First, the parties can agree to employ
different people to conciliate and arbitrate (unless they otherwise
agree at the close of the conciliation). The parties can agree not to
employ the conciliator as counsel nor to call the conciliator as a wit-
ness in any later arbitration. Second, the parties can agree not to in-
troduce as evidence in any arbitral (or judicial) proceeding any
statements or admissions made or positions taken during the concilia-
tion--especially those indicating a willingness to accept a settlement
proposal. Under this conjoined procedure, the effort at conciliation
should have a minimal impact on the arbitration.
A conjoined procedure has few of the drawbacks found in a
blended procedure. It maintains the integrity of the arbitration and
supports a reasonably effective conciliation. The parties can employ
different people with appropriate skills for each phase. The concilia-
tor can meet separately with the parties without putting a later arbi-
tration at risk. The parties can be frank with the conciliator without
fear that disclosures or settlement offers will prejudice their positions
in a later arbitration.
A conjoined procedure, however, lacks two of the advantages of
a blended procedure. Most important, the conciliator's success will
depend entirely on his diplomatic talents. He will only be able to
forecast the likely results before an independent arbitral tribunal. He
will lack a conciliator/arbitrator's power to impose a solution. Such a
power can operate powerfully, if only silently, to induce cooperation
in the conciliation. Moreover, if the dispute goes to arbitration, the
parties will have to incur the expenses of selecting new arbitrators and
educating them. This need not be a major drawback, however. If the
conciliation fails, the parties can always agree to retain the conciliator
to serve as arbitrator. They may save the expense and avoid the delay
when both conclude that no prejudice will result.
At the same time, a conjoined procedure shares some major ad-
vantages with the blended procedure. By agreeing to conciliate
before arbitrating, the parties in both cases commit themselves to a
cooperative mode of dispute resolution. They establish a friendly ba-
sis for their relationship even while they work through serious
problems. They settle their differences in a private manner without
pointing the finger of blame at anyone. They commit themselves to
settlement, the conciliator produces a report recording a lack of success, or a party notifies
the conciliator of an intention not to continue the conciliation.
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treat disputes flexibly, on a business-like basis. Most important, either
procedure improves the chance of avoiding the high levels of expense,
delay, and frustration associated with arbitration or :litigation. The
odds of maintaining a business relationship after settling the dispute
will also be better.
When deciding between a blended or conjoined procedure the
key trade-off would seem to be as follows: A blended procedure may
be more attractive if the parties prefer to emphasize conciliation.
Such an emphasis may have relational benefits from the outset.
Moreover, when the same tribunal conciliates and arbitrates, its im-
plicit or explicit forecasts of arbitration results have a special power.
The parties may be less likely to remain obstinate. These advantages,
however, come at the cost of taking risks should the conciliation fail.
The arbitration may then involve challenges to the arbitrator, and the
award might be more difficult to enforce. A conjoined procedure of-
fers the converse choice. The parties will have fully preserved the in-
tegrity of the arbitration. However, they will have lost some relational
benefits at the outset and left the conciliator with less power to bring
the parties together in a difficult case.
V. CONCLUSION
Contract planners should seriously consider making advance
agreements to conciliate in all international commercial transactions.
However, no approach to these problems is superior in a general way,
independent of a client's preference or the particularities of the trans-
action in question. There will be some transactions in which the par-
ties are better off leaving the question for later decision. When the
parties want an advance agreement, blended or conjoined procedures
may serve their interests better in different situations. The important
thing, in my view, is for contract planners to think seriously about the
conciliation alternative and how it may serve a client's interests in ef-
fective dispute resolution. I hope this article may help in that process.
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